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1 Introduction 
The idea of justice in mitigating and adapting to climate change has received much 
attention in the academic literature, civil society, and international negotiations. Scholars 
in political philosophy and law have examined the different issues related to distributive, 
retributive, and procedural justice that are implicated in climate change adaptation and 
mitigation (Posner and Weisbach, 2010; Parks and Roberts, 2010; Soltau, 2009). A social 
movement for climate justice has spread around the world and includes long-established 
global civil society networks like the Climate Action Network and the more recent 
Climate Justice Now!, whose demands and tactics seem more radical (Reitan and Gibson, 
2012; Goodman, 2009). The idea of common but differentiated responsibilities in  
climate change mitigation institutionalised one key idea of justice, the idea of historical 
responsibility, into the first international treaty to regulate climate change, the Kyoto 
Protocol. The protocol mandates binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions only to the rich industrialised countries that bear more responsibility for 
historical emissions of those gases (the so-called Annex I countries). The just division of 
the burden of climate change mitigation and adaptation has been one of the principal 
stumbling blocks in the failed efforts to negotiate a new global treaty on climate change 
to replace the Kyoto Protocol. 
In this light, it is somewhat surprising that the studies of media reporting on climate 
change politics, itself a rapidly growing field of research, has hardly looked at how 
justice claims, and more generally justifications based on different understandings of 
what is morally worthy, figure in the public debate on climate change. Even more 
surprisingly, a study that did look for moral framings of climate change in the media 
found that there were none; climate change was mostly framed in terms of its 
consequences (Dirikx and Gelders, 2010). 
In this paper, we address this gap in the literature by comparing the justifications 
given for arguments in the media debate on climate change in newspapers in France and 
the USA. We argue that the seeming absence of moral argumentation found by Dirikx 
and Gelders is a result of the rather narrow definition of moral talk that they use. Building 
on Boltanski and Thévenot’s theory of justification, we propose a wider definition of 
moral argumentation by looking at the different worlds of justification that the actors  
use to support their arguments. We operationalise justification theory for the purpose  
of analysing media debates by introducing a new methodological approach we call 
justifications analysis. 
This innovative approach offers a new way to study contested issues in global climate 
policy and the interactions between cultural discourses and policy positions. Its relevance 
to the politics of climate change stems from the fact that it helps us understand diverging 
positions of different countries in the arena of global climate politics from a new 
perspective. We argue that these differences are, at least partly, reflections of deep-seated 
cultural conceptions about what is worthy. Understanding the differences this way may 
also help in understanding why disagreement persists in the global politics of climate 
change. 
There are several reasons for selecting USA and France as our case studies. The first 
one is that the USA and the European Union, where France is one of the strongest agenda 
setters, represent two important negotiating blocks in the global politics of climate 
change. These two blocks have, so far, taken diverging positions in the negotiations, 
especially towards the third influential negotiating block, the developing countries.  
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The EU has strongly pushed for a global treaty and taken commitments to reduce GHGs, 
while the USA has refused to take on any binding reduction commitments, at least if the 
large emerging economies (particularly China and India) are not willing to do the same. 
Thus, understanding the differences of the moral points of view that are considered 
relevant in each country may help in understanding what is at stake in the negotiations for 
a global climate treaty. Second, there is some literature comparing the political cultures 
of these two countries from the perspective of moral justifications that we can use to 
construct our research hypotheses (see below). Finally, third, media reporting on climate 
change in these two has been compared with material reaching until 1997 (Brossard  
et al., 2004), so we have the opportunity to discuss our findings on more recent material 
in the light of the earlier ones. 
The literature on media reporting on climate change in the USA is, by now, quite 
extensive. Much of it has focused on reporting climate science, especially the 
disproportional influence of the ‘denialists’, who present themselves as experts and deny 
the consensus reached by climate science (IPCC, 2007) that anthropogenic climate 
change is real (e.g., Antilla, 2005; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). There are two reasons for 
this overrepresentation of denialists in the US media. First, the fossil fuel industry has 
been keen to fund denialist think tanks (Antilla, 2005; McCright and Dunlap, 2000, 2003) 
and second, the journalistic norm of balance works in this case to overamplify the 
denialists’ visibility (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, 2007). France, too, has had its share of 
denialists, notably after 2009 (Jurdant and Poupardin, 2010) but they have not gained as 
much visibility and have not had strong contacts to fossil fuel industries like the USA 
(Aykut et al., 2012, p.166). 
Comparing the cases of USA and France until 1997, Brossard et al. find three main 
differences between the two countries. First, US reporting tends to focus on the 
consequences of climate change, while the French reporting focuses more on climate 
change politics. Second, the variety of speakers in the US debate is wider. Third, in 
France the coverage does not follow an issue attention cycle observed by earlier studies 
on the USA. The authors attribute all these differences to differences in journalistic 
cultures: the US press is more oriented towards objective reporting of facts, while the 
French press is more engagé, oriented towards taking a political stand. 
Mormont and Dasnoy (1995) also find the French debate politically charged, at least 
more than it is in Belgium and Germany. They attribute this difference to the different 
structures of the journalistic, scientific, and NGO fields in the three countries.  
Aykut et al. (2012) explain the contours of the French media debate on climate change 
between 1990 and 2010 by referring to similar structural factors and their changes. 
Caillaud et al. (2011) confirm the strong political orientation of French climate change 
coverage by comparing reporting of the Bali 2007 COP in France and Germany. 
Of the two studies that have looked for moral argumentation in either of our case 
countries (Dirikx and Gelders, 2010; Caillaud et al., 2011), both studied France and 
neither found moral arguments presented there (Caillaud et al. did find some in 
Germany). Both of these studies, however, defined moral argumentation somewhat 
narrowly, to include mainly references to religion or “specific social prescriptions about 
how to behave” (Dirikx and Gelders, 2010, p.6). 
In the following sections, we will argue that a wider definition of moral 
argumentation is useful in analysing media debates on climate change and understanding 
differences in national political cultures that shape these debates. Our results highlight a 
tendency to emphasise the value of equality, democracy and legal regulation in France, 
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and a tendency in the USA to justify arguments based on market worth. Technological 
and scientific arguments are more often made in France, and ecological arguments 
equally in both countries. 
2 Analytical perspective and hypotheses 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) justification theory begins with the idea that to convince 
their opponents in a dispute, people are obliged to justify their position with references  
to the common good. In modern societies, there is a plurality of conceptions of the 
common good that may be wide, but not unlimited. The authors find seven ‘worlds of 
justification’, each one based on a different conception of the common good, and thus, a 
different measure of what is worthy. 
Based on our preliminary reading of the research material, we argue that four of these 
seven worlds of justification are of particular relevance to the media debate on climate 
change. First, civic justifications emphasise the value of democratic decision-making 
procedures, such as deliberation by democratic states within the UN system, and the just 
distribution of the burden of climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Second, market justifications may be used, either to oppose ecological arguments by 
arguing that climate change mitigation is too expensive, or to propose market solutions to 
the problem of climate change, such as carbon trading. In arguments stemming from  
the market world, then, the measure of worth is money, and it is believed that market 
mechanisms are efficient in producing common good. 
Third, industrial justifications, which place value on technological progress and 
scientific measurement, and which are based on the belief that technological innovation 
and scientific calculations are the most efficient base to battle against climate change, are 
likely to be used. Finally, ecological justifications determine the worth of actors and 
policies by evaluating their contribution to the well-being of the natural environment 
(Moody et al., 2000; Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993). 
These worlds of justification provide a kind of cultural toolkit for moral 
argumentation, a set of principles that can be assumed to be recognised by both the 
claimsmakers and the addressees that they seek to convince. The differences in the  
usage of the different worlds of justification and the ways in which they are combined  
in different countries reflect differences in political cultures (Lamont and Thévenot, 
2000). 
In the following sections, we formulate a hypothesis on the differences between 
France and the USA with regard to each of the four worlds of justification discussed 
above: civic, market, industrial, and ecological. We then proceed to test these hypotheses 
first quantitatively, and then substantiating our findings through in-depth qualitative 
analyses. 
First, Mormont and Dasnoy (1995) and Caillaud et al. (2011) both argue that the 
climate change debate in France is more political in nature than in the USA, where, as we 
have seen, the debate over the certainty of climate science has dominated instead.  
Moody et al. (2000) show that in the local environmental disputes they analysed, reliance 
on civic justifications, which invoke democracy and equality as the privileged measure of 
the common good, is more common in France than in the USA. Moving from climate 
change and other environmental disputes to ones in city-level politics more generally, 
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Luhtakallio (2012) finds that civic justifications seem to dominate French political 
debates more generally. We therefore hypothesise that 
H1: Civic justifications, based on seeing the common good in terms of democratic 
regulation and equality, are more common in France than in the USA, and are more 
readily combined with other justification types. 
Second, Zehr (2009) has observed that the US press presents “an environmental/ 
economic hybrid frame”, that is, presents a picture where economic growth and 
environmental protection go hand in hand. This leads us to expect the US debate to show 
a higher prevalence of market justifications, invoking the common good in terms of 
money and the desirable society as a materially affluent one. Moody et al. (2000) show 
that market justifications are more important in USA than in France in other 
environmental disputes besides the one on climate change. In the USA, market 
justifications also seem to be more readily combined with other types of justifications, 
such as civic ones, as in the case of the Rotary charity activities studied by Camus-Vigué 
(2000). We hypothesise, therefore, that 
H2: Market justifications, based on seeing the common good in terms of money, are 
more common in the USA than France, and are more readily combined with other 
types of justifications. 
Third, Moody et al. (2000) show that technological and scientific justifications are more 
important in France than in the USA. In the environmental disputes they study, the 
contention in the French case is focused on arguments over technical efficiency  
and infrastructure planning, reflecting the well documented presence of an ‘engineering 
mentality’ and ‘technocratic’ approaches in that country (Jasper, 1990; Lamont, 1992). 
We hypothesise, therefore, that 
H3: Justifications based on seeing the common good in terms of scientific and 
technological progress and efficiency, are more common in France than in the USA. 
Finally, ecological justifications, that is, appeals to the common good defined as well-
being of the natural environment are likely to play an important role in the public debate 
on climate change. We see no reason, however, to expect that claimsmakers in either  
of the countries would resort to these justifications more often than in the other.  
We hypothesise, thus, that 
H4: There are no significant differences in the frequency of ecological justifications 
between France and the USA. 
3 Methods and materials 
We have operationalised justification theory for the purposes of media content analysis 
by introducing a method we call justifications analysis (Gladarev and Lonkila, 2013; 
Luhtakallio, 2012; Luhtakallio and Ylä-Anttila, 2011; Ylä-Anttila, 2010). This method is 
a variant of political claims analysis developed by Koopmans and Statham (1999).  
The unit of analysis is a claim, defined as a unit of action in the public sphere. A claim 
can be a comment in an interview or a public speech, a demonstration or other action 
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whose purpose is to influence public debate. One newspaper article may, therefore, 
contain several claims by several actors. 
Unlike political claims analysis that employs a fairly standard notion of framing 
arguments, justifications analysis focuses on more specifically defined ways of 
supporting claims. We define moral justification as supporting a political claim by 
appealing to some form of common good, assumed by the speaker to be shared, at least to 
some degree, by the addressee of the claim. We classify these justifications according to 
the scheme proposed by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). These authors show that these 
‘worlds of justification’ have a long history in the tradition of western moral philosophy, 
and that the same moral principles are often used in moral disputes today. 
Our research material consists of the reporting of the UN climate conferences (COPs) 
in the New York Times and Le Monde. The papers occupy a somewhat similar position in 
the journalistic field of their respective countries, being considered quality papers with a 
strong international orientation and a political position slightly left of the centre. Thus, 
they can be expected to  
• cover international events like the COPs 
• be comparable with each other 
• provide material comparable with earlier studies, notably Brossard et al. (2004) 
comparing the same two papers for an earlier time period (1987–1997), but also with 
other studies on media coverage of climate change, as most of them have focused on 
quality papers (e.g., Dirikx and Gelders, 2010; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; 
Carvalho, 2007). 
For the first stage of the analysis (quantitative), we identified the claims presented in  
the articles and the primary justifications that were used to support them. For the 
identification of the claims, we used the codebook developed by Koopmans (2002).  
For identification of justifications, we trained our coders and developed our own 
codebook1 through coding a sample of 71 articles reporting on the COP 14, that is, 
material not included in the sample analysed here. We held five meetings, for which each 
of the six coders coded a set of 10–15 articles. Results were compared, and difficult 
coding decisions that were identified contributed to updating the rules written in our 
codebook. Thus, an updated version of the codebook was used for each new set of 
articles discussed in the consequent meeting. In the fifth meeting we recorded the results 
from each coder and calculated intercoder reliability coefficients following the model 
used by Koopmans and Statham (2010, p.53).2 Reliability easily satisfied conventional 
standards. For instance, the reliability coefficient for claim identification was 0.92 and for 
coding the primary justifications 0.95. 
The material was then coded using a qualitative content analysis (QCA) software, 
from which a data matrix for the quantitative analysis was exported and analysed with 
statistical software. In a further qualitative stage of analysis we used QCA and a more 
extensive set of codes to gain deeper understanding of the different combinations of the 
justifications used and the roles of different actors in the debate. 
We began our sampling with a period of four weeks of reporting on the Copenhagen 
COP 15, beginning one week before the conference, identified by earlier studies as the 
high point of reporting on climate change around the world (Schmidt et al., 2013),  
and searched the electronic archives of both newspapers with a set of keywords.3  
We then added similar four-week samples of the Durban COP 17 in 2011 and  
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Kyoto COP 3 in 1997 to add temporal depth to our sample. The total number of articles 
returned by this procedure was 115 for the New York Times and 474 for Le Monde. As the 
number of articles in Le Monde was so much higher, we decided to follow the approach 
often used in such cases (e.g., Vetters et al., 2009) of coding only every other article in 
that newspaper. This resulted in the final sample of 237 articles containing 386 claims for 
Le Monde and 115 articles containing 433 claims for New York Times. The articles in 
New York Times were, on average, significantly longer, which resulted in a much higher 
number of claims reported per article than in Le Monde. 
4 Results 
4.1 Justifications calling for equality, democracy, and legal regulation 
As predicted by our first hypothesis, justifications appealing to civic worth, that is, 
common good defined in terms of equality, democracy, and legal regulation are more 
common in France than in the USA. Table 1 shows the proportions of the different 
justifications used in the two countries. 
Table 1 Proportions of justifications by country 
 USA (N = 433) FR (N = 386) Difference FR–USA 
Civic total 0.33 0.44 0.11*** 
 Civic justice 0.06 0.14 0.08*** 
 Civic democracy 0.21 0.24 0.03 
 Civic legal regulation 0.02 0.06 0.04*** 
Market total 0.10 0.06 –0.04** 
 Market over ecology 0.03 0.01 –0.02 
 Market and ecology 0.07 0.05 –0.02 
Technoscientific total 0.13 0.21 0.08** 
 Greentech solutions 0.05 0.06 0.01 
 Other technoscientific 0.08 0.15 0.07 
Ecology total 0.11 0.09 –0.02 
 Ecology over market 0.02 0.01 –0.01 
 Other ecology 0.09 0.08 –0.01 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 based on a Chi-Square Test (two-sided tests). 
Civic justifications are the most common kind in both countries (33% in the USA and 
44% in France), and most of them are made in support of the process of interstate 
negotiation and democratic decision-making in the UN as a possible solution to the 
problem of climate change. While arguments generally supporting the UN process are 
very common in both countries, there is a significant difference in the frequency of calls 
for legal regulation of climate change, that is, a legally binding international treaty. 
Justifications placing value on the idea of legal regulation are three times as frequent in 
France as they are in the USA. 
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We also coded for the origin or scope of each claimsmaker (domestic/other 
nation/international). Table 2 presents the same figures as Table 1, but for domestic 
speakers only (i.e., only French claimsmakers in the French media and only American 
claimsmakers in the USA). In these figures, the difference referred to above is even more 
pronounced: French claimsmakers in the French media are five times as likely to argue 
for legal regulation of climate change (10% of claims) than American claimsmakers in 
the US media (2%). The fact that justifications favouring legal regulation are more often 
made by French actors in France and foreign actors in the USA suggests that favouring 
legal regulation is a feature of French political culture. 
Table 2 Proportions of justifications by country, domestic actors only 
 USA (N = 186) FR (N = 130) Difference FR–USA 
Civic total 0.30 0.44 0.14*** 
 Civic justice 0.03 0.09 0.06* 
 Civic democracy 0.25 0.25 0.00 
 Civic legal regulation 0.02 0.10 0.08*** 
Market total 0.15 0.03 –0.12*** 
 Market over ecology 0.05 0.00 –0.05*** 
 Market and ecology 0.10 0.03 –0.07* 
Technoscientific total 0.17 0.30 0.13** 
 Greentech solutions 0.09 0.13 0.04 
 Other technoscientific 0.08 0.17 0.07* 
Ecology total 0.09 0.10 0.01 
 Ecology over market 0.02 0.02 0.00 
 Other ecology 0.07 0.08 0.01 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 based on a Chi-Square Test (two-sided tests). 
Typically, civic justifications are used by civil society organisations, journalists, and 
politicians. But in a manner interestingly reflecting the difference between the two 
countries, in France economic organisations too find it sometimes useful to appeal to 
civic values in a way that would be difficult to imagine in the USA. A lobbyist for French 
beef producers begins his letter to the editor with reference to natural science and 
measurement (‘industrial worth’), by arguing that pasturage acts as a carbon sink and 
partially cancels out the effects of the greenhouse gas methane produced as a by-product 
of beef production. But above all, he stresses the civic worth of the French system of beef 
production, describing it as a ‘citizen project’: 
“Our model of beef production is an excellent territorial, environmental, 
cultural, economic and social project; it is a citizen project (projet citoyen) 
where the industry is committed to sustainable beef.” (Denis Sibille, President 
of Association Interbev, Le Monde 22.12.2009) 
Claims that take up issues of distributive justice in relation to climate change constitute a 
minority of claims in both countries, but are more than twice as common in France (14%) 
than in the USA (6%). In both countries, intergovernmental organisations and international 
NGOs play an important role in making justice claims. In France, however, the variety of 
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actors making justice claims is much higher, and the idea of historical responsibility  
of the long-industrialised countries for climate change is accepted by the government  
too. This is also reflected in the global negotiating arena, where France has taken a 
relatively positive or at least mediating position towards the demands of developing 
countries. 
“Europe and the rich countries, we must accept that our responsibility is 
heavier than others’ … our engagement must therefore be stronger.” (President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, Le Monde 17.12.2009) 
The USA negotiating position has oscillated between the relatively accommodating 
stance of the Clinton/Gore administration in 1997 to pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol 
and the COP negotiations entirely by Bush in 2001 to the Obama administration 
participating in the talks again. However, the notion of historical responsibility of the 
early industrialisers for their past emissions is still rejected by the US negotiators at the 
Copenhagen COP 2009: 
“I actually completely reject the notion of a debt or reparations or anything of 
the like…For most of the 200 years since the Industrial Revolution, people 
were blissfully ignorant of the fact that emissions caused a greenhouse effect.” 
(Todd Stern, the chief negotiator of the US government, New York Times 
9.12.2009) 
In addition to the issue of justice between developing and developed countries, in the 
French debate, several claims are also made for restructuring the highly developed 
countries in ways that are both ecologically and socially sustainable. In the USA, the 
government does promise to contribute to the Green Climate Fund, but rather than on 
pondering the moral responsibility behind the idea of establishing such a fund, the debate 
is focused on pragmatic details of implementing the idea. 
4.2 Market justifications 
In line with our second hypothesis, the US debate includes more references to monetary 
value as the kind of common good that ought to be considered the most important  
when discussing climate change. 10% of claims in the USA and six in France are justified 
in market terms. Again, this difference becomes more pronounced when we look at 
domestic actors only. In France, only 3% of French speakers justify their argument in this 
way, contra 15% of American speakers in the USA. 
Arguments that oppose ecological and monetary worth, and assert the importance of 
the latter over the former, are marginal in France (‘market over ecology’, 1%, zero for 
French actors), but do play some part in the US debate (3%, five for American actors). 
Most of these arguments come in one burst after the Kyoto negotiations in 1997 from 
conservative politicians and related research institutes. 
“Protecting our environment is an honorable goal”, Representative Bill Paxon, 
a fast-rising Republican star from New York, said. “But we must ask ourselves 
an equally important question: ‘Can we afford to destroy our children's 
economic future in the process?’” (New York Times, 1997) 
While there is another attack against climate action in the USA around the Copenhagen 
conference in 2009, this one is no longer based mainly on saying that acting on climate 
change is too expensive. Rather, it operates by denying the existence of the whole 
phenomenon and questioning the validity of climate science based on e-mails stolen  
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by hackers from the climate scientists at the University of Anglia (the so-called 
Climategate incident). The dispute here is no longer fought in market terms, but in terms 
of justifications that invoke the value of scientific knowledge and measurement, instead 
of monetary value. 
More common in both countries than the arguments opposing ecological and 
monetary worth are arguments that see the two go hand in hand (‘market and ecology’, 
7% in the USA, 5 in France). Our qualitative analysis shows that at least two kinds of 
these arguments: those based on monetary worth alone, and those based on a combination 
of ecological and monetary worth, seeing climate change as a business opportunity. 
The first kind calls for action on climate change with the justification that inaction is 
more expensive in the long run than action now. This argument, based solely on 
monetary value and thus made to appeal also to those who are not moved by ecological 
values as such, was famously made by the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change (Stern, 2006). While this argument is sometimes presented in France too, it is 
illustrative of the US debate that there the argument can be made by a coalition of CSOs 
and multinational businesses, who have commissioned a study from an international 
consultancy firm and underline they are targeting specifically those people to whom 
ecological values do not matter: 
“A large share of the reductions [in Co2 emissions] could come from steps that 
would more than pay for themselves in lower energy bills for industries and 
individual consumers, the report said, adding that people should take those 
steps out of good sense regardless of how worried they might be about climate 
change…The study, released yesterday in Washington, was conducted by 
McKinsey & Company for DTE Energy, Environmental Defense, Honeywell, 
National Grid, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Pacific Gas & Electric 
and Shell.” (New York Times, 2009) 
A somewhat more complicated relationship between monetary and ecological worth is 
posited by the second kind of argument, based on the idea that actions designed to fight 
climate change are not a cost at all, but rather, a business opportunity. Creating ecological 
value is not only a good in itself, but also results in the creation of monetary value at the 
same time. This argument is found in both of the countries. Perhaps the most eloquent 
version is put forward by President Obama, commenting on the Copenhagen COP: 
“We’re going to be the guys who are producing wind turbines, and we’re going 
to be the folks who are producing solar panels on rooftops…it produces jobs 
that can’t be exported; it reduces our dependence on foreign oil; it is good 
economics; it will increase our exports – oh, and by the way, it also solves the 
climate problem.” (Obama, New York Times, 2009) 
4.3 Techno-scientific justifications 
Our third hypothesis expected the French debate to include more justifications seeing the 
common good in terms of planning, scientific measurement, and technological progress 
(‘industrial worth’). The hypothesis is supported, with 21% of claims in France and 13% 
in the USA using this justification. Again, this difference becomes more pronounced 
when we look at the figures for domestic actors only (Table 2, 30% for France and 17 for 
the USA), supporting our argument that arguing more often in terms of ‘industrial worth’ 
is part of the French way of conducting political argumentation. 
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Our qualitative analysis shows that there is another important difference between 
USA and France in the use of this kind of justifications: in the USA, they are almost 
without exception combined with arguments referring to monetary value (market 
justifications), while in France, a more common combination is a reference to the 
capacity of the democratic state or another governing body such as the EU or institutions 
of global governance to steer society towards greener production and technology (civic 
justification). 
For the USA, the examples presented in the above discussion of market justifications, 
with President Obama presents green technology as ‘good economics’ and the coalition 
of CSOs and corporations argues that CO2 reductions would “more than pay for 
themselves” illustrate this point. Almost all other arguments valuing technology also 
make reference to monetary value. The EU “needs to keep the prospects of a global deal 
alive so that European business leaders and voters believe they are on track to take 
advantage of green technology markets of the future”; what is needed is “an agreement 
which sets tough, realistic global-emission reduction goals while harnessing market 
forces to lower costs, foster technological development and insure economic growth”; 
and converting a school to use geothermal energy “reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 
40% compared with conventional technology, and Dorchester County, Md., expects to 
save $400,000 in energy and maintenance costs at the school in the next 20 years”. 
Whether it is arguing for a global deal that is geared towards generating more green 
technology or local uses of emissions reduction technology, it always needs to be 
supported by a justification based on market worth. 
In France, the connection between green technology and market growth is sometimes 
made as well, but more often in Keynesian terms, with reference to a state intervention in 
the markets rather than by relying on market forces alone or giving estimated sums of 
money as proof for one’s justification. Thus, the stimulus packages proposed by states to 
counter the current economic crisis are seen as an opportunity for green technology 
investment:  
“[There is a need], on the one hand, to restart and reinforce the economic 
machine by massive investments; and on the other, to protect the environment 
by directing these investments to environmental action. The stimulus packages 
in all countries could be an occasion to advance a green economy.”  
(Le Monde, 2009) 
For many in the French debate, market forces alone are not capable of promoting green 
technology investment: “It is clear, pace the claims of those who support the liberal 
orthodoxy, that these questions go beyond the strategies of individual enterprises  
and depend more on the industrial policies of the member states [of the EU]”. The EU is 
also called to “do its share in supporting technological progress” and to “establish a 
carbon tax”.  
One idea unique to the French debate is the strengthening of the capacity  
of the system of global environmental governance by establishing the World 
Environmental Organisation. This proposal has been discussed in international fora for 
decades now – the last time it was on the agenda but was rejected was at the Rio+20 UN 
environmental conference in 2012. In the US debate this idea is not discussed at all. In 
France the right-wing president Sarkozy wowed to ‘fight until death’ to defend the 
proposal, and the president of a multinational corporation goes to great lengths to assert 
the important role of states and the desirability of a supranational regulator: 
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“The public powers of different countries, through environmental regulation 
and incentives and support for innovation, have an essential role to 
play…especially in protecting the interests of the poorest countries. This 
requires that the countries decide to establish an international environmental 
organisation.” (Businessman, Le Monde, 2009) 
The desirability and feasibility of political governance of the problem of climate change 
is, in France, not something promoted by leftist politicians or idealist CSOs, but 
something that seems to be accepted quite widely. 
Our fourth hypothesis, stating that there is no significant difference in the use  
of ecological arguments in the two countries is also supported. The frequency of 
explicitly ecological arguments in both countries suggests that saying that climate change 
is an ecological problem is no longer news in the post-1997 period studied here. Instead, 
especially in the context of the UN COPs, the issues of justice and democracy related to 
climate change, its economic costs and possible benefits, and scientific measurement and 
technological control – the other three justification types that we have discussed – are 
brought more to the fore. 
5 Conclusions 
We began by observing that while there is a significant academic and political debate on 
the moral implications of climate change and climate policy, conventional approaches to 
the study of media frames do not always seem to be sensitive to the moral evaluations 
presented in the media debate on climate change. We proposed an alternative approach  
to the study of moral talk, defining it as giving justifications that appeal to some form of 
common good, assumed by the speaker to be shared, at least to some degree, by the 
addressee of the claim. 
We found that climate change is more often discussed in terms of justice, democracy, 
and legal regulation in France, while monetary value plays a more important role as a 
justification for climate policy arguments in the USA. Technological and scientific 
arguments are more often made in France, and ecological arguments equally in both 
countries. 
Almost all of these differences become more pronounced when we limit the analysis 
to domestic actors only.4 This means that a part of the less typically French arguments in 
the French media are actually put forward by foreign actors, and the same goes for the 
less typically American arguments in the US case. This finding, thus, supports our 
argument that the differences reflect more general conventions of political argumentation 
in the two countries. 
Moreover, it is not only the typically ‘civic’ actors, civil society organisations, and 
democratically elected politicians who use civic justifications in France. Economic 
organisations also resort to civic justifications, and businessmen and a right-wing 
president call for regulation of climate change by states or new international 
organisations. Similarly in the USA, in addition to businesses that are the obvious users 
of market justifications, civic organisations and a (somewhat) left-leaning president opt 
for justifications in terms of monetary value. This, again, supports our argument that the 
differences we find are not due to, say, the sourcing strategies of the journalists, but 
reflect the differences between the two political cultures more generally. 
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We drew our hypotheses from studies on the differences of national repertoires of 
justifying political arguments on various issues and found that many of these differences 
are also visible in the media debates on climate change. Thus, we have argued that the 
differences found here are not only about what happen to be the current ways of framing 
climate policy arguments, but rather, reflect more deep-seated differences in national 
political cultures. 
What is the significance of these findings to the global politics of climate change? 
Disagreements in the global politics of climate change, therefore, are not just about the 
details of particular policy proposals, but also about moral principles and understandings 
of what is worthy. Understanding these national differences in the media debate may also 
help in understanding disagreement and the current political stalemate in the global 
political arena. 
With the rapid economic development and consequential rise in GHG emissions  
in countries like China, Brazil, India, and South Africa, the focus of global climate 
politics has increasingly shifted from the US–EU axis analysed in this paper to the 
opposition between the emerging economies of the Global South and the long-
industrialised countries of the North. Future research on climate change and the media, 
therefore, would do well to move beyond single-country case studies and paired 
comparisons and to include the emerging economies in comparative research designs. In 
particular, questions of moral evaluation, central to many present North–South 
disagreements over climate policy, should be investigated from this kind of wider 
comparative perspective. 
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Notes 
1The codebook is available from the authors upon request. 
2Our complete report of the reliability calculations can be found at http://bit.ly/clic-reliability.  
The calculations are made for the purposes of a more extensive research project on climate change 
and the media, and thus they contain several variables not used in the present article. 
3The search terms were climate change/changement climatique OR global warming/rechauffement 
climatique OR greenhouse effect/effet de serre OR the city where the UN COP was being held at 
the moment, e.g., copenhagen/copenhague. The resulting articles that did not address the topic of 
climate change or climate politics were then removed manually from the sample. 
4The only exception is the share of justice claims, where the difference between the countries 
narrows by two percentage points when we look at domestic actors only. This reflects the fact that 
justice claims are, in both countries, often put forward not by national players but by international 
civic organisations such as Oxfam International or intergovernmental organisations. 
